

Demonstrating the Effectiveness of MOSES for Separation of Execution Modes

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Motivation

- ▶ Same device multiple usage (e.g. BYOD policy)
- ▶ Need to separate sensitive corporate data from personal one
- ▶ Avoid energy demanding (para)virtualizations (Trango, VirtualLogix, L4 microkernel, L4Android)

MOSES Idea and Features

Main idea: separate *security Profiles* (SP); applications replicated in one SP cannot access data in other SPs.

Features:

- ▶ Separation of application data between different profiles
- ▶ Ability to have fine-grained policy
- ▶ Compatible with existed applications
- ▶ Security Profiles can be activated automatically and manually

MOSES Architecture




Figure 1: MOSES Architecture

MOSES Security Profile configuration

Steps:

- ▶ Specify name, default rule and priority
- ▶ Assign allowed applications
- ▶ Assign Special Rules
- ▶ Assign Contexts




Figure 2: Moses Security Profile configuration

Moses Special Rule configuration

Steps:

- ▶ Specify the name of Special Rule
- ▶ Select rule type (action)
- ▶ Select fine-grained operation
- ▶ Enter target of the rule
- ▶ (Optional) Enter perform action




Figure 4: Configuration of Moses Special Rule

Security Profile change

Moses Security Profiles change be changed:

- ▶ Automatically (by the system based on Contexts assigned to SP)
- ▶ Manually (using *MosesSpChanger* application)




Figure 3: Security Profile change

MOSES operation




Figure 5: Main window of Launcher application